中国金融抑制问题的政治经济学

本文从利益集团理论的视角对中国金融抑制问题给出了一个政治经济学解释，认为中国金融抑制的制度安排内生于给予改革当中利益受损集团金融补贴的需要，为了维护转轨时期的社会稳定，降低改革成本，在财政能力持续下降的情况下，中央政府通过加强对金融体系的控制，以利差租金和货币发行收益为主要路径向国有企业、政府财政提供金融补贴。但近年来，随着居民收入在国民收入分配中所占比例的下降，由金融抑制引发的社会风险的累积、金融效率损失等问题使得中国如果继续维持金融抑制政策将产生巨大的社会成本和效率损失。

Political Economy of Financial Repression Issue in China

Based on the perspective of interest group theory,this paper offered an interpretation of political economy to the financial repression issue in China,which insists that the institutional arrangements of China's financial repression was born to the requirements of giving financial subsidies to the groups whose interests were infringed in the reform.Under the circumstances of continual fiscal capacity decline,the central government should strengthen financial system control with rent margin and currency gain...