官商结盟的体制效应——以近代中国民营企业发展为例的分析

开放经济条件下,在一个相对集权的体制中,为规避潜在的风险,民营企业通常会采取"消极适应或积极适应"两种发展形式。"以牺牲企业对外部(技术、市场)变化适应性为代价换取产权安全"的消极适应型发展的直接后果是使得政府提升国家产业竞争力的努力受挫。与消极适应型发展模式不同,一些民营企业会选择积极适应型的发展模式,即通过寻求官方庇护的政治方式来确保创新收益安全,企业发展与滋生腐败之间极易发生联系。"‘腐败’成为企业发展‘润滑剂’"现象的出现,侵蚀了国家政治体制,加剧了政府和社会大众的不满,客观上加大了企业发展面临的潜在风险。体制"怪圈"的形成,既不利于国家竞争力的提升,又极可能引发政府统治的合法性危机。本文分析表明,只有将民营企业从坏体制"始作俑者"的角色中解放出来,才能破解体制怪圈。这需要从根本上改变民营企业"既是被需要的,同时又是被歧视的"尴尬处境。中国近代史上有关民营企业发展的案例为本文假说提供了丰富的实质性内容。

Systemic Effect of the Collusion between Politicians and Businessmen: an Analysis on the Development of Private Enterprises in Modern China

To avoid the potential risks,private enterprises often take two developing patterns—"passive adaptation or positive adaptation"—under open economy in a relatively centralized system.The direct consequence of passive adaptation is to make the nation’s efforts of promoting national industrial competitiveness suffer a setback.However,some private enterprises would choose positive adaptation instead of passive adaptation.The consequence of positive adaptation is that the development of private enterprises would always be associated with corruption.The notion "corruption as the lubricant of private enterprise development" would erode the political system,intensify the discontentment of government and public,and increase the potential risk of private enterprise development.The so-called systemic "strange circle" is harmful for promoting national competitiveness,and is likely to cause the government legitimacy crisis.The paper shows that the "strange circle" may be broken only when private enterprises are freed from the role of "the initiator of evil".To achieve this aim,we need to change the embarrassing situation of private enterprises—"needed and discriminated".The development of private enterprises in modern China provides substantial evidence for our hypotheses.