Does R&D cooperation facilitate price collusion? An experiment |
| |
| Institution: | 2. Department of Surgery, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee;1. School of Economics, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK;2. School of Economics, Yonsei University, Seoul 03722, South Korea;1. Christopher Newport University, United States;2. University of Toledo, United States;3. Rochester Institute of Technology, United States;1. Department of Economics, 10 Pulteney Street, Adelaide 5005, Australia;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom |
| |
| Abstract: | We examine in a laboratory experiment whether R&D cooperation facilitates tacit price collusion. For two scenarios of technological spillovers, a baseline treatment without binding contract possibilities and a contract treatment where it is possible to credibly commit to an R&D contract, are run. We find that the degree of price collusion in the contract treatments is significantly higher in periods where R&D contracts are made than in periods without contracts, and than in the baseline treatments. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
