股权结构与股权代理成本关系的实证研究——基于2011年创业板上市公司的数据研究

公司治理的基础是股权结构，核心问题就是如何降低代理成本，但是由于特殊的历史原因，我国股权分置制度存在的弊端严重影响着公司治理。根据代理理论，股权代理成本可以划分为管理层与股东之间利益冲突引起的第一类代理成本和控股股东与中小股东之间利益冲突引起的第二类代理成本。所以本文就基于股权分置改革后的视角，以2011年创业板上市公司为样本，采用理论与实证相结合的分析方法来分析股权结构与股权代理成本之间的关系，得出股权集中度可以降低第一类代理成本和第二类代理成本；股权制衡度在一定程度上可以降低第二类代理成本，但会提高第一类代理成本；负债也会有助于降低第一类代理成本；而管理层和机构投资者持股并未起到降低代理成本的作用。

An Empirical Study on the Impacts of Ownership Structure and the Equity Agency Cost --Based on the Data of Listed Companies in 2011 from the GEM Board

Equity structure is the basis of corporate governance, the core problem of corporate governance is how to reduce agency cost, but due to special historical reasons, the existing disadvantages of equity division system in China has seriously affect on the corporate governance. According to agency theory, agency cost of equity can be divided into the first kind agent cost caused by conflicts of interest between shareholders and management and the second agent cost caused by conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. So this article is based on the perspective of after equity division reform, and takes data of listed companies in 2011 from the GEM board as samples. By adopting the combination of theory and empirical analysis method to analyze the relationship between equity structure and equity agency costs, the results shows that equity concentration can reduce the first agent cost and the second agency cost. To a certain degree, equity balance can reduce the second agency cost, but will improve the first agent cost. Debt would also help reduce the first agent cost. But holdings of managers and institutional investors does not have the effect of reducing agency cost.