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基于博弈视角的银企信贷关系分析
引用本文:孔翔,李帮义.基于博弈视角的银企信贷关系分析[J].技术经济与管理研究,2009(2):112-114.
作者姓名:孔翔  李帮义
作者单位:南京航空航天大学,江苏,南京,210016
摘    要:银行和企业之间的信贷关系是影响我国经济增长的重要因素。由于信息不对称,银企信贷关系存在着很大的不确定性。本文通过对银企信贷行为的博弈分析,找出信贷风险的存在原因。通过增大企业贷款前的伪装成本,减少企业的逆向选择行为;增大企业贷款后的惩罚成本,减少企业的道德风险行为,从根本上改变银企之间的信息不对称状况,有利于银企关系的良好发展。

关 键 词:博弈  伪装成本  逆向选择  惩罚成本  道德风险

Game Theory Analysis on Bank-Enterprise Credit Relation
KONG Xiang,LI Bang-Yi.Game Theory Analysis on Bank-Enterprise Credit Relation[J].Technoeconomics & Management Research,2009(2):112-114.
Authors:KONG Xiang  LI Bang-Yi
Institution:Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics;Nanjing Jiangsu 210016;China
Abstract:The relationship between banks and enterprises has become an important factor affecting economic growth of China.Because of asymmetric information,there remains uncertainty between banks and enterprises.In this paper,I gave a prelimina ry analysis on bank-enterprise credit relation with a game theory,and found the causes of credit risk.In order to reduce adverse selection before credit and moral hazard afterwards,we augmented the whitewashing cost and penalty.As the paper proved,this way can essentially inf...
Keywords:game theory  whitewashing cost  adverse selection  penalty  moral hazard  
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