Behavior in one-shot traveler’s dilemma games: model and experiments with advice |
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Authors: | Susana Cabrera C Mónica Capra Rosario Gómez |
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Institution: | (1) Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, Spain;(2) Department of Economics, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA;(3) Junta de Andalucía y Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, Spain |
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Abstract: | We report results of one-shot traveler’s dilemma game experiments to test the predictions of a model of introspection. The
model describes a noisy out-of-equilibrium process by which players reach a decision of what to do in one-shot games. To test
the robustness of the model and to compare it to other models of introspection without noise, we introduce non-binding advice.
Advice has the effect of coordinating all players’ beliefs onto a common strategy. Experimentally, advice is implemented by
asking subjects who participated in a repeated traveler’s dilemma game to recommend an action to subjects playing one-shot
games with identical parameters. In contrast to observations, models based on best-response dynamics would predict lower claims
than the advised. We show that our model’s predictions with and without advice are consistent with the data.
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Keywords: | Game theory Introspection Experiments Simulations Decision with errors |
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