On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Medical Oncology, Cantonal Hospital of St Gallen, St Gallen;2. Department of Thoracic Surgery, University Hospital of Lausanne (CHUV), Lausanne;3. SAKK Coordinating Center, Bern;4. Departments of Medical Oncology;5. Radiation Oncology, University Hospital of Lausanne (CHUV), Lausanne;6. Department of Medical Oncology, University Hospital of Bern (Inselspital), Bern;7. Cantonal Hospital of Lucerne, Lucerne;8. Department of Medical Oncology, University Hospital of Basel, Basel;9. Cantonal Hospital of Winterthur, Winterthur;10. Department of Oncology, University Hospital of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland |
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Abstract: | We consider a resource-dependent economy initially ruled by the elite. The transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite. The occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities, both being driven by the elite׳s redistribution and repression policies. First, we show that when a political transition is inevitable, the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office. Second, we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance, and how it relates to the elite׳s policies. More resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime, which may not be the case of a repressive regime. Finally, we interpret the Arab spring sequence in light of our findings. |
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Keywords: | Political transitions Natural resources Timing of revolutions Duration of autocracies Arab spring |
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