Endogenous private information structures |
| |
Authors: | Sjaak Hurkens Nir Vulkan |
| |
Institution: | a Department of Economics and Business and CREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain b The Sa?¨d Business School, Oxford University, Park End Street, Oxford OX1 1HP, UK |
| |
Abstract: | We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when ‘Nash’ is replaced by ‘sequential’. We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition. |
| |
Keywords: | C72 D82 D83 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|