The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment |
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Authors: | Abigail Barr Danila Serra |
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Institution: | 1. Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 2. Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
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Abstract: | Using a simple one-shot bribery game simulating petty corruption exchanges, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, indicating that the issue of artificiality may be of particular importance in bribery experiments. |
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