Bidding ‘as if’ risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback |
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| Authors: | Tibor Neugebauer Javier Perote |
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| Institution: | 1.Institut für Finanzmarkttheorie,Universit?t Hannover,Hannover,Germany;2.Dpto. de Economía Aplicada II y Fundamentos del Análisis Económico,Universidad Rey Juan Carlos,Madrid,Spain |
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| Abstract: | Experimental research on first price sealed bid auctions has usually involved repeated settings with information feedback
on winning bids and payoffs after each auction round. Relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium, significantly higher
bidding has been reported. The present paper reports the results of experimental first price auctions with n=7 where feedback on payoffs and winning bids is withheld. Under these conditions, average bidding is below the risk neutral
Nash equilibrium prediction but converges to it with repetition.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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| Keywords: | Experimental economics First-price sealed-bid auctions Independent private value model Bidding theory Risk aversion Learning |
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