Amended final-offer arbitration over an uncertain value: A comparison with CA and FOA |
| |
Authors: | Cary Deck Amy Farmer Dao-Zhi Zeng |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Sam M. Wlaton College of Business, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA;(2) Graduate School of Management, Kagawa University, Takamatsu 760-8523, Japan;(3) Center for Research of Private Economy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, 310027, China |
| |
Abstract: | Arbitration is increasingly employed to resolve disputes. Two arbitration mechanisms, conventional arbitration (CA) and final-offer
arbitration (FOA) are commonly utilized, but previous theoretical and empirical research has found that they are unsatisfactory.
Several alternative mechanisms have been proposed, but ultimately laboratory research has found that they do not offer an
improvement. An exception is amended final-offer arbitration (AFOA), which not only has desirable theoretical properties but
also has been demonstrated to outperform FOA in the laboratory. This study provides a direct laboratory comparison of AFOA
with CA. Also, by utilizing an environment with an uncertain payoff to one of the parties, this study tests the robustness
of AFOA’s performance relative to FOA. The results indicate that AFOA does outperform FOA, but that AFOA is only weakly better
than CA.
JEL Classification C7, C9, J5, K4 |
| |
Keywords: | Arbitration Bargaining Dispute resolution Experiments |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|