ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TO DIVERSIFY CONTRACTUAL RISK* |
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Authors: | Bo?açhan Çelen Saltuk Özertürk |
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Institution: | 1. Columbia University, U.S.A.;2. Southern Methodist University, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | Are hedging transactions that diversify a manager’s compensation risk detrimental to incentives, or can they improve contracting efficiency? If hedging provides efficiency benefits, should the manager or the firm undertake it? In our model, both the firm and the manager can trade financial portfolios to diversify the manager’s compensation risk. Prior to the portfolio selection, the parties need to acquire information on how different financial portfolios fit their diversification purposes. We illustrate that financial portfolios correlated with firm‐specific risk improve contracting efficiency. For equal information costs, it is optimal for the firm to undertake the hedging on the manager’s behalf. |
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