| 矿山开采生态补偿监管机制的博弈分析及政策建议 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 李娟,;胡振琪.矿山开采生态补偿监管机制的博弈分析及政策建议[J].生态经济(学术版),2008(1):265-267. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 李娟 ;胡振琪 |
| |
| 作者单位： | [1]中国矿业大学（北京）“山生态安全”育部工程实验室,北京100083; [2]河南农业大学资源与环境学院,郑州450002 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 矿山开采生态补偿的最终目的是将矿山生态环境恢复治理到或超过原生态环境生产能力。目前，制约我国矿山开采生态补偿机制的主要原因在于监管不严和激励不足。本文运用博弈论分析工具，分析了政府一采矿企业间的监督博弈。最后，提出了建立政府统一监管体制，强化监管处罚，鼓励群众参与监管；明晰产权，增大企业矿山生态补偿效益；加大科技研究，降低修复成本，是促进采矿企业规范补偿行为的有效措施。
|
| 关 键 词： | 矿山开采生态补偿 监督博弈 政策建议 |
Game Analysis and Policy Suggestion on Supervision Mechanism of Ecology Compensation Regulation System in Mining |
| |
| Institution: | LI Juan, HU Zhen-qi ( 1.China University of Mining and Technology (Beijing), Beijing 100083, China; 2.Henan Agriculture University, Zhengzhou 450002, China) |
| |
| Abstract: | The final aim to the mining ecology compensation is to restore the damaged ecological environment in mine up to or exceeding the primary productivity. At present, the main reasons which restrict the mining ecology compensation are short of the supervision and prompting in our country. Based on the game theory, this paper analyses the supervision game between governments and mining enterprises, and projects the following suggestions to normalize mining enterprises＇ behaves of mine ecology compensation： 1） to create an unified system of supervision and management; 2） to stress the punishment; 3） to encourage the masses for supervising; 4） to perspicuity the mine land rights; 5） and to increase scientific and technical input. |
| |
| Keywords: | mining ecology compensation supervision game POlicy suggestion |
| 本文献已被 维普 等数据库收录！ |
