| 后《京都议定书》时代国际碳减排利益博弈机制分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 岳利萍,白永秀.后《京都议定书》时代国际碳减排利益博弈机制分析[J].生态经济(学术版),2011(5). |
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| 作者姓名： | 岳利萍 白永秀 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北大学,经济管理学院,陕西,西安,710127 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金，陕西省哲学社会科学基金，陕西省软科学项目，陕西省人口资源与环境经济学重点学科资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 根据<京都议定书>参与国和缔约国的不同政治经济状况将<京都议定书>的成员国分为欧盟、美国、中国和其他国家等四类.利用博弈论对<京都议定书>之后各利益集团之间的争斗进行分析.指出后<京都议定书>时代国际碳减排利益分配不均是导致减排联盟不稳定的主要因素,进而从福利经济学角度讨论应将应对气候变化的"共同但有区别的责任"原则扩展为"界定以排放权为基础的公平的碳减排合作框架"和"界定以最终消费为基础的公平的碳减排分担框架".
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| 关 键 词： | 后《京都议定书》时代 碳减排 博弈 |
The Game Mechanism of International Carbon Emissions Reductionin Post Kyoto Protocol Era |
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| YUE Liping,BAI Yongxiu.The Game Mechanism of International Carbon Emissions Reductionin Post Kyoto Protocol Era[J].Ecological Economy,2011(5). |
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| Authors: | YUE Liping BAI Yongxiu |
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| Institution: | YUE Liping,BAI Yongxiu(School of Economics & Management,Northwest University,Xi'an Shaanxi 710127,China) |
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| Abstract: | According to the different situations of politics and economics,Kyoto Protocol's contracting states are divided into four categories: the EU,USA,China,and other countries.Through the theory of the Gambling and Chess this paper analyzes the struggling among these groups which have different interests in this issue and then points out that the main factor that leads to unstable alliance of international carbon emission reduction is that uneven allocation of benefits of carbon emissions reduction on the intern... |
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| Keywords: | post Kyoto Protocol era carbon emissions reduction the games |
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