| 企业员工薪酬激励的新制度经济学思考 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘蕙,肖建杰,徐海燕,尹杰.企业员工薪酬激励的新制度经济学思考[J].经济与管理,2005,19(8):53-57. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘蕙 肖建杰 徐海燕 尹杰 |
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| 作者单位： | 扬州大学,经济学院,江苏,扬州,225009 |
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| 摘 要： | 首先简介了薪酬制度的激励作用,并针对现有薪酬制度存在的一些问题,用新制度经济学和博弈分析法揭示其面临的持续低效率困境的根源,在此基础上提出相应的解决该困境的建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 薪酬激励 业绩工资 重复博弈 员工持股 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-3890(2005)08-0053-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年3月31日 |
Considerations Based on the New Institutional Economics about the Encouragement of Enterprise Employees′Salary |
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| LIU Hui,XIAO Jian-jie,XUE Hai-yan,YIN Jie.Considerations Based on the New Institutional Economics about the Encouragement of Enterprise Employees′Salary[J].Economy and Management,2005,19(8):53-57. |
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| Authors: | LIU Hui XIAO Jian-jie XUE Hai-yan YIN Jie |
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| Abstract: | This article first briefly introduces the function of salary encourages, aims at some problems that current salary system exists, uses the new institutional economics and the game analysis methods to public its source of the continuously low efficiency predicament that faces and then puts forward some homologous suggestion to solve that predicament. |
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| Keywords: | salary encourages accomplishment wages repetition game employee holds |
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