完善中国独立董事制度本土化的思考

独立董事制度作为“舶来品”,并不是一剂灵丹妙药,在中国上市公司大股东滥权、中小股东保护机制缺失等治理背景下,独立董事的独立性、行权能力及激励约束机制均存在一定的问题。独立董事可以看成是剩余控制权进一步社会分工的结果,股东拥有终极控制权,独立董事为上市公司的职业监管者,监管的对象是代理问题,而其本身与股东、政府、公众、董事会构成复杂的委托代理关系。因此,独立董事制度本土化的过程就是解决独立董事与本土上市公司各利益主体间的代理问题。

Perfecting the Localization of Independent Director System

Independent director system as an "import" is not a panacea,China's listed companies are in shareholder abuse,the loss protection of small shareholders,and so on,there are certain problems for the independence of the independent directors and ability of them and the right incentive and restraint mechanisms.Independent directors can be seen as the outcome of the social division of residual rights of control,shareholders have the ultimate control.Independent directors of the listed companies are occupational regulators.The object of regulation is agency problem,there are complex relationship between shareholders and the government and the public and Board of Trustees.Therefore,localization of the independent director system is a process of resolving the agency problem between the independent directors and the local interests.