首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

审计失败的博弈分析与防范对策
引用本文:陈念东,邹丽云,孙世攀.审计失败的博弈分析与防范对策[J].经济与管理,2006,20(3):55-57.
作者姓名:陈念东  邹丽云  孙世攀
作者单位:1. 闽江学院,管理系,福建,福州,350108
2. 山东经济学院,会计学院,山东,济南,250014
摘    要:近年来,中国审计失败事件层出不穷。为深入了解其原因,有必要对委托代理审计关系中各方经济行为进行博弈分析。为防范审计失败,应完善公司治理结构,加强会计师事务所制度建设和审计收费管理,加大行业协会的监管作用。

关 键 词:审计失败  审计风险  博弈论
文章编号:1003-3890(2006)03-0055-03
收稿时间:12 4 2005 12:00AM
修稿时间:2005年12月4日

Game Analyses and Countermeasures for Audit Failure
CHEN Nian-dong,ZOU Li-yun,SUN Shi-pan.Game Analyses and Countermeasures for Audit Failure[J].Economy and Management,2006,20(3):55-57.
Authors:CHEN Nian-dong  ZOU Li-yun  SUN Shi-pan
Institution:1.Department of Management, Minjiang Institute, Fuzhou 350108, China; 2. School of Accounting, Shandong Economy College, Jinan 250014, China
Abstract:Affairs about audit failure are happening continually in recent years. In order to probe into its reasons, it is necessary to make game analyses for economic behaviors among the entrusted audit relationships. Based on game theory, the paper analyzes behaviors of related to entrusted audit, and puts forward countermeasures of avoiding audit failure.
Keywords:audit failure  audit risk  game theory
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号