地方政府保障房供给的合作性努力与自私性努力：一项实证研究

地方政府具体落实保障房供给政策，其行为取向是保障房有效供给的决定性因素。构建改进的多任务委托代理模型，研究激励约束机制与地方政府付出的努力，以及与保障房供给行为取向之间的关系。研究结果表明：其一，地方政府的合作性努力水平与激励强度正相关。其二，约束机制缺失时，地方政府的自私性努力水平不随外部性强度的变化而变化；存在有效约束机制时，自私性努力水平与惩罚强度负相关。因而，增加保障房有效供给，既要激励地方政府的合作性努力，也要约束地方政府的自私性努力。

Cooperative Effort and Selfish Effort of Local Government in Public Housing Supply -An Empirical Study

The local government is responsible for the supply of public housing, whose supply behavior orientation is a decisive factor in effective supply of public housing. To construct improved multiple task principal-agent model, it studies incentive and restraint mechanism and local government efforts, and the relationship among the low-income housing supply behavior orientations. Research results show that, firstly, there is a positive correlation between local government＇s cooperative effort level and incentive intensity. Secondly, when the constraint mechanism is missing, the local government＇s selfish effort level does not change with the change of external intensity; when constraint mechanism is effective, there is a negative correlation between selfish effort level and punishment strength. Thus, to increase the effective supply of public housing, not only need to encourage cooperative effort, but also need to restrain selfish effort.