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商业银行信息披露真实性监管的博弈研究
引用本文:周光宇,蒲勇健.商业银行信息披露真实性监管的博弈研究[J].经济管理,2007(24):45-50.
作者姓名:周光宇  蒲勇健
作者单位:重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044
摘    要:本文用博弈论方法研究分析在商业银行信息披露监管过程中存在的真实性问题,认为加强信息披露监管可以提高金融体系稳定性和效率。通过建立信息披露监管博弈模型,得出在多个监管者条件下,监管者即使接收到信号是虚假信息也认为是真实信息的概率增大的结论。针对我国银行信息披露中存在的问题,提出了完善惩戒机制、建立监管协调机制、加强市场约束和监管问责等政策建议。

关 键 词:商业银行  信息披露  真实性
文章编号:1002-5766(2007)24-0045-06
收稿时间:2007-09-06

An Analysis of China Banking Regulation Efficiency and Improvement Suggestion
ZHOU Guang-yu, PU Yong-jian.An Analysis of China Banking Regulation Efficiency and Improvement Suggestion[J].Economic Management,2007(24):45-50.
Authors:ZHOU Guang-yu  PU Yong-jian
Abstract:The paper conducts game theory method to research the problem concerned the truth of commercial bank information disclosure, We know that strengthen information disclosure regulation can enhance the stability and efficiency of financial system, However, when there are several regulators involved, regulators would recognize the false information disclosure as the true information even though the regulators receive the exact signal of false information, It is an interest conclusion, Then, the paper gives several suggestions, which includes calling for establishing and consummating punish and regulating harmonizing mechanism, strengthening marketing discipline and regulating responsibility.
Keywords:commercial bank  information disclosure  truth
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