| 供应商管理库存中的道德风险分析与契约设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘海军,陈菊红.供应商管理库存中的道德风险分析与契约设计[J].经济问题,2010(3). |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘海军 陈菊红 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安理工大学经济与管理学院;河南理工大学经济管理学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70602017);;陕西省软科学基金资助项目(2005KR95) |
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| 摘 要： | 分析了供应商管理库存环境下,除双重边际效应以外另一个导致供应链分散决策时零售商订购量下降的因素,即道德风险问题。针对道德风险,采用求解完全且完美信息动态博弈中子博弈完美纳什均衡的一般方法,即逆推归纳法设计了一个数量折扣契约。当参数满足一定关系时,该契约不仅可以有效消除供应商管理库存中的道德风险,而且也使供销双方期望利润实现了帕累托改进,因此该契约不仅是有效的,而且也是可执行的。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应商管理库存 道德风险 完全且完美信息动态博弈 契约设计 |
The Moral Hazard in Vendor-managed Inventory and Contract Design |
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| LIU Hai-jun,CHEN Ju-hong.The Moral Hazard in Vendor-managed Inventory and Contract Design[J].On Economic Problems,2010(3). |
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| Authors: | LIU Hai-jun CHEN Ju-hong |
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| Institution: | 1.School of Economics and Management;Xi an University of Technology;Xi an 710054;China;2.School of Economics and Management;Henan Polytechnic University;jiao zuo 454003;China |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the another factor that led to a decline in addition to thedouble marginalization effect in decentralized decision-making for retailer order,namely,the moral hazard problem under the vendor-managed inventory environment.Against the moral hazard,we use of general method for solving sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in complete and perfect information dynamic game,namely,backward induction to design a quantity discount contract.Since the contract does not only make the parties(supplier and ... |
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| Keywords: | VMI moral hazard complete and perfect information dynamic game contract design |
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