Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection |
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| Authors: | Douglas Gale |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street, New York, NY 10003, USA (e-mail: douglas.gale@nyu.edu) , US |
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| Abstract: | Summary. The paper analyzes an economy with two-sided adverse selection, focusing on equilibria that satisfy a refinement based on
the notion of strategic stability. In the familiar case of one-sided adverse selection, agents reveal all of their private
information as long as the contract space is rich enough. However, with two-sided adverse selection, the sufficient conditions
for separation are much stronger.
Received: September 3, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999 |
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| Keywords: | and Phrases: Signaling Adverse selection Markets Rationing Types Equilibrium Refinement Strategic stability Walrasian |
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