Banning Bidders from All-pay Auctions |
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Authors: | Domenico Menicucci |
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Institution: | (1) Dipartimento di Matematica per le Decisioni, Università degli Studi di Firenze, via C. Lombroso 6/17, I-50134 Firenze (FI), Italy |
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Abstract: | We consider an all-pay auction with complete information among the bidders; the seller does not observe the bidders’ values. We show that for some information structures in which the seller has a small uncertainty about the valuations, it is profitable for him to exclude from the auction all but two (randomly selected) bidders even though the latter are ex ante identical from his point of view.I am grateful to Paolo Bertoletti who introduced me to this topic and provided useful comments. I also thank Dan Kovenock (Co-Editor) and two anonymous referees for suggestions which considerably improved the exposition. |
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Keywords: | All-pay auction Complete information Exclusion principle |
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