Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information |
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Authors: | John B Van Huyck Raymond C Battalio Frederick W Rankin |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4228, USA;(2) College of Business, 255 Rockwell Hall, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1271, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects
is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state
at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information.
This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the
interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions.
Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program
provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research
Program. |
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Keywords: | Stability Equilibrium selection Information Reinforcement Learning Adaptive behavior |
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