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Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market

Institution:	1. Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Kolkata, India;2. Centre for Training and Research in Public Finance and Policy (CSSSC), Calcutta, India;3. CES–ifo, Munich, Germany;4. GEP, Nottingham, UK;5. National Law University, Delhi, India;6. Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India;1. Department of Economics, U.S. Naval Academy, USA;2. FAME\|GRAPE, ul. Mazowiecka 11/14, 00-052, Warsaw, Poland;1. University of Valencia, ERI-CES, Spain;2. Faculty of Economics, Avda. dels Tarongers, s/n, 46022, Valencia, Spain;1. Aarhus University, Department of Economics, Fuglesangs Allé 4, 8210, Aarhus V, Denmark;2. The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15, Stockholm, Sweden;3. Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institute for Sociology and Social Research, Gebäude D4, 3. Stock Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020, Wien, Austria;1. Department of Economics and Law, Korea Military Academy, 574 Hwarang-ro, Seoul, Republic of Korea;2. School of Economic, Political & Policy Science, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Rd., Richardson, TX, 75080, USA

Abstract:	We show theoretically how tax evasion is facilitated by informal credit market through tax deferment. Our model is empirically based. Using sham litigation, tax evaders earn a higher rate of return than the stipulated penalty rate for tax evasion while the government loses tax revenue. We propose an upfront part–payment of the disputed amount of tax as a solution to the form of tax evasion we describe.

Keywords:	Delayed tax payment Tax evasion Sham litigation Informal credit market H25 H26 H32 K34 K41 K42
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