What constitutes a constitutional amendment culture? |
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| Institution: | 1. College of Business Administration, Department of Accounting, Finance, & Economics, Winthrop University Rock Hill, SC, 29733, USA;2. Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, 79409, USA;1. RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Ruhr Graduate School in Economics, Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128, Essen, Germany;2. Jacobs University Bremen, Campus Ring 1, 28759, Bremen, Germany;3. RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Jacobs University Bremen, Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128, Essen, Germany;1. University of Lodz, Poland;2. University Paris Nanterre, France;1. Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain;2. Department of Economic Theory and History, Universidad de Má laga, Spain;1. University of Tübingen, Germany |
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| Abstract: | Why are some constitutions amended frequently and others hardly at all? An obvious candidate determinant is constitutional rigidity, i.e., the size and number of procedural barriers to amendment. Given some demand for amendment, greater rigidity implies a smaller supply. However, measures of rigidity often do not correlate significantly (or even with the predicted sign) with amendment rates. Ginsburg and Melton (2015) argue that amendment culture – “shared attitudes about the desirability of amendment” – is a more important determinant of amendment rates. We study up to 128 constitutional episodes from 54 countries and estimate relationships between amendment rates and Hofstede cultural indices. Cultures that are more individualistic and less prone to uncertainty avoidance are associated with higher amendment rates. When cultural dimensions are controlled for, the lagged amendment rate (Ginsburg and Melton’s proxy for culture) is not a robust correlate. |
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| Keywords: | Constitutions Constitutional amendments Constitutional rigidity Constitutional design Culture Hofstede indices K0 P50 P16 |
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