Reserve accumulation and exchange rate policy in China: The authoritarian elite's aim of political survival |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management and Business, King''s College London, UK;2. Department of Economics, University of Athens, Greece;1. Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany;2. Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, USA;1. Department of Psychology & Leibniz ScienceCampus Primate Cognition, University of Goettingen, Gosslerstrasse 14, 37073 Goettingen, Germany;2. Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany |
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| Abstract: | Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, China has significantly increased its foreign exchange reserves. We argue that the resulting abnormal levels of currency reserves accumulated by Chinese authorities are not intended to maximize the citizenry's economic welfare, as in a mercantilist or a precautionary account, but rather to forestall the elite's own political demise. This goal has been pursued mainly by generating large current account surpluses through manipulation of the renminbi exchange rate. The Chinese elite has sought to promote the acceptance of this policy by influencing the costs of collective action taken by winners and losers. |
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| Keywords: | Autocratic China Exchange rate policy Foreign reserves Regimes |
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