Complementarity in contests |
| |
Authors: | Stergios Skaperdas Constantinos Syropoulos |
| |
Institution: | aDepartment of Economics, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697, USA;bDepartment of Economics, Florida International University, University Park, DM-321 Miami, FL 33199, USA |
| |
Abstract: | To facilitate the study of contests in general equilibrium, we examine winner-take-all contests in which the prize is complementary to the effort of the contestants, as inputs are in production functions or final goods in utility functions. We focus on the effects of technological factors and endowments on the effort and the welfare of the contestants. Most of our findings differ considerably from the standard model of contests in which prize and effort are independent. In particular, we find a critical role for the elasticity of substitution between prize and effort. For example, under low elasticities of substitution, a higher prize reduces the effort exerted by the contestants. |
| |
Keywords: | Rent-seeking Conflict Complementarities |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|