Coups,revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca, Piazza dell''Ateneo Nuovo, 1, Milan, Italy;2. Institute of East-Asian Studies and Mercator School of Management, University of Duisburg-Essen, LE 738, Forsthausweg 2, Duisburg, Germany;1. Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Rome, Italy;2. Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Via A. Depretis 72, 00184, Rome, Italy;1. Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Welthandelsplatz 1, A-1020 Vienna, Austria;2. Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Arsenal, Objekt 20, A-1030 Vienna, Austria;3. University of Vienna, Department of Economic Sociology, Oskar Morgenstern Platz 1, A-1090 Vienna, Austria;1. ADRI-CG, Deakin University, Burwood, Victoria 3125, Australia;2. Department of Economics, Monash University, Caulfield East, Victoria 3145, Australia |
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| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to explore the interaction of two mechanisms that might constrain the power of dictators: the threat of a coup by the selectorate and a revolution by citizens. Our results help explain a stylized fact, namely that autocracies are far more likely to be either the best or the worst performers in terms of growth and public goods policies. To this end, we focus on accountability within dictatorships using a model where both the selectorate and the citizens are the principals and the autocrat is the agent. Our results highlight that both excessively strong and excessively weak dictators lead to poor economic performances, and that a balanced distribution of de facto political power is required to incentivize the dictator to choose efficient economic policies. |
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