中国财政分权、金融发展、 工业化与经济增长的省际差异

本文采用1978-2006年中国28个地区的省际面板数据建立了检验财政分权、金融发展、工业化与经济增长之间长期关系的协整模型（co integration model），并采用完全修正的最小二乘法（FMOLS）对模型进行估计。本文把地方政府官员参与政治晋升锦标赛竞争的行为影响经济绩效的假设引入对分权化改革过程的分析，对中国改革开放以来地方政府之间的竞争何以在促成经济总量高速增长的同时又导致各地区在财政分权、金融发展、工业化和经济增长方面呈现出差异的原因进行了分析，进而得出本文的分析结论并对其政策含义进行了讨论。

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON REGIONAL DISPARITIES OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION,FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT,INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA

In this paper, we adopt the provincial panel data of Chinas 28 regions since 1978 and develop a co integration model to test the long run relationship among fiscal decentralization, financial development, industrialization and economic growth. Then, we use the FMOLS method to estimate the model. We also embed a hypothesis that the behaviors of local government officials who join in the“political promotion tournament”have made impacts on economic performance into the analysis of process of decentralization reform, and try to explain the reasons why, since the reform and opening up, the competition among the local government officials has caused the regional disparities in fiscal decentralization, financial development, industrialization and economic growth while it has propped up Chinas high rate of economic growth in aggregate amount. In addition, we discuss the policy implication that is contained in our empirical findings.