供需双方信息不完全、交易费用差异与火车票市场扭曲——对“倒票”行为的交易费用分析

本文不认为供求不均衡是“黄牛”倒票现象存在的根本原因。本文针对火车票市场套利行为屡禁不止的热点问题构造动态博弈模型，论证了交易费用与套利行为之间的关系。模型通过对需求方购票的交易费用进行比较，逐层深入地分析了增加产品供给、增加购买渠道和差别定价等途径的效果，发现此类举措并不能有效遏制“黄牛”行为，反而还损害了低收入消费者的福利。研究表明，即使在供需均衡的情况下，供需双方信息的不完全，尤其是需求群体内部的信息不完全程度存在差异，会造成需求群体交易费用的差异，进而导致需求群体内部的资源配置被扭曲，而这才是“黄牛”群体长期顽固存在的根本原因。本文选取2002—2016年火车票贩票情况的真实数据进行了实证分析，印证了博弈模型的结论。而降低这种扭曲程度的同时降低需求方交易费用之间的差距，才是解决此类产品市场上资源配置无效率问题最有效的办法。

THE INFORMATION DIFFERENCE,TRANSACTION COST AND TRAIN TICKET MARKET DISTORTION——Analysis on Transaction Cost of Ticket Scalping

This paper considers the imbalance of supply and demand is not the basic cause of the ticket scalping phenomenon We demonstrate the relationship between transaction cost and arbitrage behavior with a dynamic game model Based on the comparison of consumers transaction cost, the supply increase or price discrimination could not control the ticket scalping phenomenon effectively and it could harm the low income consumers welfare The primary cause of the long term persistence of the “scalpers” is the incomplete information and distorted resources allocation This paper provides an empirical analysis with the data from 2002 to 2016, which confirms the conclusion of the game model In general, it is the most effective way to deal with the inefficiency of resource allocation in the markets of such products that reducing the gap of consumers transaction costs