为了指标而竞争*——来自中国煤矿企业的证据#br#

中国矿难治理取得了不可忽视的成就，但总结其成功经验的研究尚显不足。本文认为安全生产的总量指标控制是一种降低中国煤矿企业矿难死亡人数的有效方式。笔者手工搜集了2002—2006年中国煤矿企业矿难死亡人数和省级安全生产控制考核数据，并与工业企业数据库进行匹配，发现单个煤矿事故死亡人数和同地区其他煤矿事故死亡人数之间显著负相关，说明企业间存在指标竞争现象。广义双重差分回归结果显示，在控制指标越少的省份，企业间指标竞争越激烈。异质性分析发现，在超标省份或者主管官员晋升的关键时期，指标竞争更加激烈。最后，单个煤矿企业死亡人数与异省邻市矿难死亡人数不相关，排除了矿难导致监管加强的“威慑效应”。本文的研究结果表明，煤矿安全生产总量指标控制对企业安全生产有显著作用。

COMPETING FOR QUOTAS——Evidence from Coal Mine Firms in China

China has made significant achievement in governing and reducing coal mine accidents, but the research on the successful experiences is still insufficient. This paper considers that the quota of total death number is an effective way to reduce the number of deaths caused by coal mine accidents. In this paper, we manually collect the firm level number of deaths of coal mine accidents and province level quotas of deaths of production safety in 2002-2006, and merge them with CIED. We find that the number of accident deaths of a coal mine is negatively related with the other firms in the same region, indicating that there is a “competing for quotas” phenomenon. The results of generalized DID model show that in provinces with less quotas, the coal mine firms compete more intensely. Heterogeneity analysis shows that competition has become more intense both in the over quotas provinces and during the time when officials promotion yet to be decided. Finally, we find that the coal mine accident death in a single firm is not correlated with that of other firms in the near prefectures but not the same province, excluding the “deterrent effect” of increased supervision resulting from the mining accidents. The results in this research show that the quota of deaths has significant effect on reducing deaths.