控股股东股权质押会增加企业权益资本成本吗——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2003—2014年A股上市公司为研究样本，探讨了控股股东股权质押与权益资本成本之间的关系。本文研究发现，相较于不存在控股股东股权质押的上市公司，存在控股股东股权质押的上市公司的权益资本成本更高。进一步分析，本文发现股权质押引起的掏空行为发挥着中介作用，还发现控股股东股权质押与权益资本成本之间的正相关关系在股价崩盘风险较高、上证A股指数较低、熊市年度组、信息质量较低组更加明显，这表明控股股东股权质押与上市公司权益资本成本之间的正相关关系是由控股股东股权质押引起的掏空行为和控制权转移风险引起的。最后，本文发现有效的公司治理能够缓解控股股东股权质押与权益资本成本之间的正相关关系。本文的研究有助于进一步认识和了解控股股东股权质押可能产生的经济后果。

DOES CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS SHARE PLEDGE INCREASE THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL——Based on Empirical Data of China's Listed Companies

This paper discusses the relationship between the controlling shareholders' share pledge and the cost of equity capital, based on A share listed companies from 2003 to 2014. This paper finds that the equity capital cost of listed companies with controlling shareholder' share pledge is higher than that of listed companies that do not have the controlling shareholders' share pledge. Further analysis, we find that the tunneling caused by the share pledge play the role of mediating effect. The relation is more obvious in the higher crash risk, the lower Shanghai A share index, the bear market annual group, and the lower information quality group. This suggest that the positive relation between controlling shareholders' share pledge and cost of equity is caused by the controlling shareholders' tunneling and the risk of control right transfer, which in turn increase with the controlling shareholder's share pledge. At last, we find that effective corporate governance can alleviate the adverse impact of controlling shareholders' share pledge on the cost of equity capital. The article will help us better understand the possible economic consequences of controlling shareholders' share pledge.