通胀目标制与汇率目标制不能共存吗

基于汇率传递的风险溢价渠道，本文将我国利率调控通胀、外汇储备对冲干预汇率纳入新凯恩斯政策模型，构建双目标双工具政策分析框架，比较泰勒规则与双目标双工具规则下通胀目标与汇率目标共存的经济机制与效应。本文模拟显示：（1）双目标双工具政策框架下通胀目标与汇率目标能够共存，此时通过影响汇率风险溢价来盯住汇率不影响通胀；而单工具政策下两目标无法共存，此时降低国内资产的收益率盯住汇率会刺激居民的消费行为引起通胀。（2）国际资本冲击下，双目标双工具政策在固定汇率的同时能保证经济稳定；而当贸易条件恶化时，选择完全浮动汇率制度最优。央行政策损失分析进一步验证了以上结论。（3）随着金融市场化改革深入，外汇储备稳定汇率的有效性将下降，冲销成本会大幅提升。资本账户开放下，双目标双工具政策仍是央行抵御外部资本冲击的首选政策；但是汇率市场化后，通胀目标制与双目标双工具政策效果基本无差异。本文结论的启示是：面对国际资本，需必要的汇率管制；但是面对贸易冲击，可适度提升汇率弹性来减少冲击对产出和通胀的影响。

CAN INFLATION TARGETING AND EXCHANGE RATE TARGETING NOT COEXIST

Based on the risk premium channel of exchange rate transmission, Chinas interest rate regulation inflation and foreign exchange reserve hedging intervention rate are included in the new Keynesian policy model, and a dual objective and dual tool policy analysis framework is constructed. Compare the economic mechanism and effect of the inflation target and the exchange rate target under the Taylor rule and the dual objective dual tool rule. The simulation shows as follows: (1) Under the dual target and dual tool policy framework, the inflation target and the exchange rate target can coexist. At this time, the exchange rate risk premium to peg the exchange rate does not affect inflation; while the single tool policy cannot coexist with the two goals, at this time, the domestic The rate of return on the assets pegs the exchange rate will stimulate residents consumption behaviour to cause inflation. (2) Under the impact of international capital, the dual objective and dual tool policy can ensure economic stability while fixing the exchange rate; and when the terms of trade deteriorate, choose the fully floating exchange rate. The system is optimal. The central banks policy loss analysis further validates the above conclusions. (3) With the deepening of financial market reform, the effectiveness of the stable exchange rate of foreign exchange reserves will decline, and the write off cost will increase substantially. Under the opening of the capital account, the dual objective and dual tool policy remains the preferred policy for the central bank to resist external capital shocks. However, after the exchange rate is marketized, there is basically no difference between the inflation target system and the dual target dual tool policy. The conclusion of the conclusion is that in the face of international capital, necessary exchange rate controls are needed; but in the face of trade shocks, exchange rate flexibility can be moderately increased to reduce the impact of shocks on output and inflation.