城市商业银行属地原则放松对银行绩效的影响*——基于重力去管制模型

中国银行业监管机构中国银监会始于2006年逐步放松对城商行属地原则的限制，城商行“走出去”发展也渐趋成势。本文将重力去管制模型（Gravity deregulation Model）和放松管制政策相结合，一定程度上克服了内生性问题。研究结果表明，由于属地原则放松，城商行呈现出地理多元化的发展趋势，而城商行分支机构地理多元化对银行绩效具有一定的抑制作用。实证研究发现：总部与分支机构之间的距离不断扩大，银行资产收益率和资产回报率进一步降低；但是，其相对市场规模越大，资产收益率和净资产收益率会有一定程度的提升。这种抑制作用反映了总部与异地分支机构间存在信息不对称和代理问题。

THE INFLUENCE OF THE DEREGULATION OF CITY COMMERCIAL BANKS' TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE ON BANKS PERFORMANCE：BASED ON THE GRAVITY DEREGULATION MODEL

In 2006, the China Banking Regulatory Commission gradually deregulated city commercial banks' territoriality principle, and “going out” became the development trend of city commercial banks. This paper combines the Gravity deregulation Model and deregulation policy, which overcomes the endogeneity problem to a certain extent. The results find that the geographical diversification of city commercial banks inhibited their performance. As the distance between headquarters and branches continues to expand, the return on assets and the return on equity further reduce. However, the larger the relative market share is, the higher the return on assets and the return on equity will be. The results show that due to the deregulation of the territoriality principle, city commercial banks show a development trend of geographic diversification, and the geographic diversification of city commercial banks has an inhibitory effect on their performance, which reflects the information asymmetry and agency problems between headquarters and off site branches.