证券分析师关注与上市公司成本黏性*

本文以2002—2014年沪、深A股上市公司为样本，研究了证券分析师关注对成本黏性的影响。研究发现，越多分析师关注的公司，其成本黏性显著越低，并且这种关系受公司内部股权结构和外部市场化水平的影响；在国有企业、第一大股东持股比例较低及市场化水平较低的上市公司中，分析师关注对成本黏性的影响更显著。进一步的研究发现，明星分析师及团队分析师的关注能更好地抑制成本黏性。本文不仅有助于全面认识分析师发挥监督作用的机制和情境，而且有助于深化成本黏性影响因素的研究，对于降低企业的成本黏性以提高资源配置效率具有启示意义。

SECURITY ANALYST COVERAGE AND THE COST STICKINESS OF CHINESE LISTED FIRMS

Based on a data of Chinese listed companies during 2002—2014, this paper empirically tests the effect of security analysts coverage on cost stickiness The empirical results show as follows First, the more is analysts coverage, the lower is cost stickiness This relation is influenced by internal equity structure and external marketization level Second, the relation is stronger when degree of marketization is lower, firms is state owned, largest shareholders shareholding is lower Third, star and group analysts can better inhibit cost stickiness than non star and individual analysts This paper is not only helpful in uncovering the factors which affect cost stickiness in China, but also useful in understanding the government mechanism of analyst, having enlightenment significance to improve the efficiency of resource allocation.