问询函监管与银行信贷决策的改善*

近年来，证券交易所推行的问询函监管逐渐成为保障和改善上市公司信息披露质量的重要机制，其实施效果自然成为监管者和学者关注的焦点。本文从银行的角度研究问询函监管对外部利益相关者的溢出效应，具体考察问询函监管对银行信贷决策的影响。研究发现，在公司被出具问询函后，银行的贷款利率显著更高，贷款期限显著更短，银行贷款要求提供担保的可能性和比例更高。进一步研究发现，当公司处于信息风险和信用风险相对较高的情境中，或银行对信息风险和信用风险较为关注的情况下，银行贷款利率上升幅度更加显著，不过，贷款期限、担保要求等非价格条款并没有显著差异。同时，问询函对银行信贷决策的影响在银企之间存在较强的信息不对称时更加显著。最后，本文发现公司收到问询函以后，分析师预测分歧度显著提高，这表明信息风险是问询函监管影响银行信贷决策的一个可能渠道。

THE INQUIRY LETTERS AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF BANK LOAN DECISION

In recent years，the inquiry letter sent by the Securities Exchange has become the important mechanism to ensure and improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companiesIts implementation effect has become the focus of regulators and academicsFrom the perspective of bank，this paper studies the economic consequences of the inquiry letters on the external stakeholdersSpecifically，this paper studies the impacts of the inquiry letters on bank loan decisionsThe study finds that the inquiry letters motivate banks to provide loans with higher interest rates，shorter maturities and higher likelihood of being securedFurther analysis indicates that the above relations are more significant when banks are concerned about the borrowers information risk and credit risk or borrowers' information risk and credit risk is high，but there are not significant differences in the non price termsAt the same time，the impact of inquiry letters on bank credit decisions is more significant when there is a stronger information asymmetry between banks and enterprisesFinally，the study finds that there is a significant increase in analysts' predict dispersion after the companies receive the inquiry letters，which indicates the information risk is the possible influence channel