Search efficiency,wage dynamics and welfare |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Accident Compensation Corporation, Wellington, New Zealand;2. School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT University, Building 80, Level 11, 445 Swanston Street, Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia;1. School of Data Sciences, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, 310018, PR China;2. Department of Statistics, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada;1. INCEIF, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia;2. Taylor''s Business School, Taylor''s University, Malaysia;3. Nottingham University Business School, University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus, Semenyih, Malaysia;4. Suleman Dawood School of Business, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), Lahore, Pakistan;1. School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing, 100191, China;2. College of Business, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV 89557, USA;1. School of Economics and Finance, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Shaanxi, China;2. Business School, University of Jinan, China;3. Finance Research Institute, Shandong Collaborative Innovation Center for Capital Market Innovation and Development, University of Jinan, China;1. Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand;2. Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash University, Victoria, Australia;1. Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, 430073, Hubei, China;2. Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, Hangzhou, China;3. School of Economics and Management, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan, 430074, China;4. College of Economics and Management, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan, 430073, Hubei, China |
| |
| Abstract: | Advances in information technology have improved the job-search process in the labor market. We analyze the effects of this improvement by constructing a search-and-matching model with two sectors: a risky sector with firm-specific productivity shocks and a risk-free sector. The risky sector is characterized by a low level of commitment between employers and workers – either party can end the employment relationship. We show that a better job-search process generates more job matches in the risky sector, and this benefits workers by improving their outside options. The effect on employers is subtle: while it is easier to fill vacancies, workers become more expensive. At the same time, the ease of finding new workers makes it harder for employers to keep their wage promises to workers and increases wage volatility. Our paper contributes to the literature by offering a novel explanation for the observed rise in wage volatility. |
| |
| Keywords: | Search efficiency Self-enforcing contracts Wage volatility E24 J31 J63 J64 |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
