Privatization of Water-Resource Development |
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Authors: | Stephen P Holland |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, NC 27402-6165, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper analyzes the inefficiencies from market power and return-flow externalities in private construction of a water
project. The model pays special attention to increasing groundwater pumping costs, project set-up costs, limited project capacity,
and return flow to the aquifer. For a given capacity, the return-flow externality causes project owners to construct the project
too late when the price of groundwater is too high because the external benefit of return-flow to the aquifer is not captured.
Market power exacerbates these effects since the project owner delays construction to accelerate groundwater overdraft. The
return-flow externality and market power also decrease installed capacity and increase overdraft from the aquifer. Applying
the model to the construction of the Central Arizona Project (CAP) for a given capacity, the estimated deadweight loss from
hypothetical private construction of the project ($0.853 billion) is substantially less than the literature’s estimate of
deadweight loss from actual construction by the Bureau of Reclamation ($2.603 billion). However, under the federal subsidies
and insecure property rights that accompanied the CAP, private construction results in a larger estimated efficiency loss
($6.126 billion). |
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Keywords: | Central Arizona Project groundwater optimal control privatization return flow surface water water water project construction |
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