Environmental Policy in a Green Market |
| |
Authors: | José Luis Moraga-González Noemi Padrón-Fumero |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Erasmus University and Tinbergen Institute, Burg. Oudlaan 50, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands;(2) Dept. de Economía de las Instituciones y Estadística, Universidad de La Laguna, Facultad de CC.EE, Campus de Guajara, 38071 La Laguna, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, España |
| |
Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of some frequently-used environmental policies in a duopolistic market where purchasers are willing to pay more for less polluting goods. When consumers differ in their environmental awareness, a cleaner and a dirtier variant coexist in equilibrium. The higher the average willingness-to-pay for the good, the lower are variants' unit emissions but the higher are industrial aggregate effluents. A maximum unit emission standard reduces unit emissions of both variants, but boosts firms' sales and consequently increases industrial aggregate emissions. As a result, social welfare may be reduced. We also explore the effects of technological subsidies and product charges, including differentiation of charges. |
| |
Keywords: | environmentalists environmentally differentiated duopoly green consumption green market product charges subsidies unit emission standards |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|