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最终控制人特征、政府控制与公司价值
引用本文:朱松.最终控制人特征、政府控制与公司价值[J].中大管理研究,2006,1(1):98-119.
作者姓名:朱松
摘    要:本文采用中国A股上市公司最终控制人属性、控制权比例、控制权与所有权背离程度、控制链长度等因素对上市公司价值进行了研究。回归结果表明最终控制人对上市公司的控制权与公司价值之间呈非线性的正U型关系,而所有权与控制权背离程度与公司价值的关系并不显著。政府目标多元化导致政府控制的上市公司其目标并不一定是股东价值最大化,政府附加的社会责任给上市公司的价值带来负面影响,这种负面影响主要来自于下级政府部门。政府对上市公司控制链越长,企业受到政府的干预就越少,公司的价值就会越高;而控制链对于非国家最终控制的公司的价值影响并不显著。本文还发现不同非政府实体最终控制的上市公司之间价值不存在显著差异。

关 键 词:最终控制人  两权背离  控制链  政府控制  公司价值

The Characteristics of Ultimate Shareholders, Government Control and the Value of Firms Zhu Song
Zhu Song.The Characteristics of Ultimate Shareholders, Government Control and the Value of Firms Zhu Song[J].China Management Studies,2006,1(1):98-119.
Authors:Zhu Song
Abstract:This paper investigates the value of listed companies in China A-share securities market using the characteristics of ultimate shareholders,including the nature,control right,divergence of control right and ownership,and the length of control chain.Regression results show that that the control right of ultimate shareholder is a none-linear function of firm value,a U shape,while the divergence of control right and ownership is not significant negatively related to firm value.Multiplicity of government goals imposes negative effect on the companies it controls,and this influence comes mainly from the inferior governments.The longer the control chain,the less negative effect government brings to the list companies,thus the higher the value of firms.While for listed companies controlled by non-state entities,the influence of control chain of firm value is not obvious.I also find that the value of none state control companies is not significantly different.
Keywords:ultimate shareholder  divergence of rights  control chain  government control  firm value
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