国有股权、经营风险、预算软约束与公司业绩:中国上市公司的实证发现

以中国上市公司为例,本文首次采用分量回归模型实证分析了国有股权对公司业绩的复杂影响。我们发现:在经营表现较差的上市公司,国有股东监督内部人的积极作用超过了行政或政治干预公司经营的消极作用;而在经营表现较好的上市公司,以上作用没有显著差异。源自国有股权并受经营风险影响的上市公司的预算软约束预期损害了所有公司的业绩。与经营表现较好的公司相比,在经营表现最差的公司,国有股东监督内部人的积极作用以及国有股权导致的预算软约束预期的消极作用都更为显著。虽然国有股权对公司业绩影响的净效果在所有上市公司中都为负,但在业绩最差的上市公司里负面作用最为突出。政策含义在于国有股权的调整应当从业绩最差的上市公司开始。

State Ownership, Operational Risk, Soft Budget Constraint, and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from China's Listed Companies

Based on China's listed companies, this paper empirically investigates the complicated effect of state ownership on firm performance in a quantile regression framework. We find that state shareholders play a positive role by monitoring insiders more while politically intervening less in those listed companies with poor performance, while insignificant effect by state ownership is observed in those strong companies. Manager's soft budget constraint expectation hurts performance of all listed companies,which is affected by operational risk and based on the presence of state ownership. Compared with those firms with relatively good performance, listed companies with the worst performance present significantly larger magnitude of both the positive effect by state shareholders monitoring insiders and the negative effect due to the soft budget constraint expectation. Although the net effect of state ownership through above two channels is always negative in all listed companies, this negative impact is the strongest in those companies with the weakest performance. A direct policy implication is that government share adjustment should be started from listed companies with the weakest performance.