不完全合约与履约障碍——以订单农业为例

本文用不完全合约理论分析了我国农产品销售合约的问题 ,解释了我国农产品销售合约履约率低的内在原因———合约的不完全性 ,进而论述了产生于不同原因的两种具有本质区别的不完全性 :“通常意义上的”不完全性和“注定”不完全性 ,探讨了由此适用于这两种不完全性的不同解决方案和制度安排。对前一种情况 ,可以采取市场和行政、法律的手段 ;而对于后一种情况 ,经济学和法律均没有更好的解决方案。本文重点讨论了后一种合约的约因、缔约条件、履约失败和制度安排 ,并由此引出了由不完全合约所产生的对法律合约理论的进一步思考。本文还就合约双方的市场风险承担问题得出了一个重要的结论 :合约双方并非因为签约就将风险完全地转移给了另一方 ,在应该免责的情况下 ,合约双方应该共同承担市场风险。

Incomplete Contract and the Barrier to Performance:A Case Research on the Farm Produce for Order

Based on the incomplete contract theories,this article analyzed some questions on the sale contract of farm produce,and stated that the inherent reasons of the low rate of performance of sale contract of farm produce were incompleteness of the contract.Further,the incompletness of the contracts were divided into two kinds:the “usual" and the “destined",and hence the ways to deal with them through the institutional arrangement would be different also,the former could be solved by the economic,executive,and legal means,however,for the latter,there are still no any effective economic or legal solution until now.The authors focused on the rationale,sign conditions,the failure of performance and relevant institutional arrangements about the latter kind of the incomplete contract,and derived some meanings of incomplete contract on the legal contract theory.We got an important conclusion on the risk sharing that any one side among the two agents of a contract couldn't transfer completely the market risks to the other.