| 政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007(8). |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 辛清泉 林斌 王彦超 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院，中山大学管理学院，中山大学管理学院 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 广东省自然科学基金项目(批准号:7300503)的阶段性成果。 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 本文在代理理论框架下,基于中国国有企业薪酬管制的制度背景,就经理薪酬对投资过度和投资不足的影响进行了理论分析,并以我国上市公司2000—2004年的数据为样本,实证检验了经理薪酬在企业资本投资决策方面的治理效应。结果发现,当薪酬契约无法对经理的工作努力和经营才能作出补偿和激励时,有更多的证据表明,地方政府控制的上市公司存在着因薪酬契约失效导致的投资过度现象。上述研究发现,对理解中国国有企业经理薪酬管制的经济后果具有重要意义,也为当前关于国有企业产权改革和薪酬改革的争论提供了一个有益的视角。
|
| 关 键 词： | 经理薪酬 政府控制 投资过度 投资不足 |
Government Control,Executive Compensation and Capital Investment |
| |
| Xin Qingquan,Lin Bin and Wang Yanchao.Government Control,Executive Compensation and Capital Investment[J].Economic Research Journal,2007(8). |
| |
| Authors: | Xin Qingquan Lin Bin and Wang Yanchao |
| |
| Abstract: | Based on agency theory of the firm, and the special institutional settings that there exists the regulation on executive compensation in Chinese SOEs, this paper analyses the impact of executive compensation on over-investment and under-investment. Subsequently, Using the data on China's listed companies data from 2000 to 2004, we investigate governance effect of executive compensation on capital investment decision. We find that, on the condition of executive diligence and talent not being compensated, there are more evidence shows that government control especially SOELG control and SAMB control has induced over-investment. |
| |
| Keywords: | Executive Compensation Government Control Over-investment Under-investment |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录！ |
|
