国有企业人才流失的契约性阻挠与社会福利损失:一种代理理论分析

随着我国非国有经济的不断发展壮大 ,人才流失已对许多国有企业运行效率以及长期稳定发展造成严重影响。面对人才市场竞争 ,绝大多数国有企业在人才引进、人事管理以及收入分配等诸多领域都做出了适应性调整和改革。本文在一种委托—代理框架下 ,从契约理论角度考察了国有企业为防止人才流失所普遍实行的薪酬激励契约和阻挠人才流失契约之间的内在联系 ,然后在此基础上研究了阻挠人才流失契约如何影响社会总福利水平 ,并针对围绕国有企业劳动契约缔约过程所安排的正式制度上的某些缺陷 ,提出若干改革建议。

Contractual Obstruction of Run off of Talented Person from China's State-owned Enterprises and the the Loss of Social Benefit

Along with the development and growth from China's non-state sector, the frequent brain drain from China's state-owned enterprises has caused so many problems that not only severely decrcase the efficiency of these enterprises but also make their prospects gloomy. However, confronted with the intense rivalry from the labor market, most state-owned enterprises have more or loss adaptively reformed or readjusted their rigid recruitment policy, obsolete personnel administration and ineffective rcward systems. With the framework of principal-agent theory, this paper examines the relationship between the two types of contracts: performance-related pay contract and brain drain-proof contract, which are widely used to attract and constrain talented employce by state-owned enterprises. Then, based on this analysis, it gives a model to show how brain drain-proof contracts cause deadweight loss and consequently reducc the value of state-owned enterprises. Finally, aimed at the weakness of the existing intitutions arranged for labor contract negotiation process of state-owned enterprises, this paper proposes a regulatory reform scheme.