中国的高货币化之谜

通过将政府对银行体系的补贴和担保因素引入Mckinnon的最优货币化模型,本文初步认定政府对银行体系的控制是导致中国高货币化结果的基本原因。而基于BaileyCagan函数的提示,本文进一步发现,在政府对银行体系实施有效控制的前提下,内部货币扩张具有与外部货币扩张不同的货币需求“预算约束”和福利后果。其要害是,它可以兼容在货币化进程原本存在显著利益冲突的政府和居民部门的效用,从而使得中国的高货币化与货币价格的稳定并行不悖。本文的结论是,由于中国的高货币化具有十分特殊的金融制度内涵,因此既不能简单夸大其负面效应,也不能过高期望数量调整政策的效果。合理的做法应当着眼于调整政府、银行体系与居民部门基于内部货币扩张而形成的利益关联机制,以改变货币需求的“预算约束”和潜存于经济中的货币化激励。

An Insight into the High Level of China's Monetarization

The paper intends to provide a new perspective of understanding the high level of monetarization in China's economy. The majority of literature tends to agree with the hypothesis proposed by Goldsmith, viz, monetarization path. Actually, the pattern of “inverted U” applies even in the long term. Where the challenge lies is with the significant gap. By introducing government's subsidy and guarantee into Mckinnon's model of optimal monetarization, the paper finds that government's control over banking system constitutes the basic explanation of the high level. With the help of Bailey-Cagan, the paper further finds that, given the control of government, the endogenous money expansion has a budget restraint and a welfare effect different from those of exdogenous expansion. Conclusion is that the high level phenomenon should be properly evaluated. The reasonable reaction is to readjust the interlocking benefit mechanism concerning government, bank and household so that the present budget restraint of money demand and the driving force behind monetarization can make changes.