不完全契约理论:一个综述

标准的契约理论或委托-代理理论假定契约是完全的,然而现实中的契约是不完全的。契约的不完全会导致事前的最优契约失效,当事人在面临被“敲竹杠”的风险时会做出无效率的专用性投资。经济学家们在研究如何最大程度地减少由于契约不完全所导致的效率损失时,发展了一个新兴的不完全契约理论。本文以一个基本模型为基点,围绕专用性投资效率问题,从司法干预、赔偿、治理结构、产权以及履约等多个视角,全面地介绍了不完全契约理论的产生、发展、应用以及面临的挑战和未来的前景。

Incomplete Contracting Theory: A Survey

The standard contract theory or principal-agent theory assumes that contracts are complete; however, realistic contracts are incomplete. The contractual completeness leads to the failure of ex ante optimal contracts and inefficient specific investment due to the risk of hold up. The economists develop the incomplete contracting theory to analyze how to furthest avoid the inefficiency due to contractual completeness. Focusing specific investment efficiency with incomplete contracts, basing a basic model, this paper totally introduces the origin, development, application, and prospect of incomplete contracting theory from the viewpoint of judicial intervention, damage measures, governance structure, property-rights, and implementation.