知识产权保护与“南方”国家的自主创新激励

本文构建了一个扩展的具有自主创新的南北产品周期模型,讨论了知识产权保护对南方自主创新的激励效应以及南北双方的总体影响。本文发现,严格的知识产权保护对南方自主创新的激励效应以及南北双方的总体效应依赖于南方的初始技能劳动水平和北方创新性质导致的市场结构。在垂直创新的寡头市场,严格的知识产权保护对南方自主创新没有激励效应,它对南北双方都造成伤害;在水平创新的垄断竞争市场,当南方技能劳动短缺时,严格知识产权保护在短期有利于南北双方,但并不激励南方自主创新。当南方技能劳动充裕时,适度的知识产权保护会激励南方的自主创新,并在长期对南北双方都有利。研究发现,南方存在一个最优知识产权保护强度,其依赖南方的技能水平以及市场的竞争程度。

Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Southern Nations' Indigenous Innovation Incentives

We develop an extended North-South Product cycle model in which Southern indigenous innovation is endogenous,discussing the incentive effects of intellectual property rights(IPRs) on indigenous innovation,and the overall effects of IPRs on the North and the South both.Our model predicts these effects depend on the initial skill level and absorptive capacity in the South,and more crucially on market structure due to the nature of North innovation.Under oligopoly due to vertical innovation,tighter IPRs hurts both regions,and it does not induce indigenous innovation.Under monopolistic competition due to horizontal innovation,tighter IPRs benefits both in the short run if skill levels are scarce in the South,and there is no indigenous innovation,too.Tighter IPRs benefits both in the long run if skill levels are abundant,and it induces indigenous innovation.We find that there exists an optimal degree of IPRs protection in the South,which depends on the initial skill level and market structure,and it does induce indigenous innovation,and may differentiate from that in the North.