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上市公司家族控制与企业价值
引用本文:苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003(8).
作者姓名:苏启林  朱文
作者单位:暨南大学管理学院 510632 (苏启林),广东技术师范学院财经系 510630(朱文)
摘    要:本文以 2 0 0 2年在上海、深圳证券市场上公开交易的 1 2 8家家族类上市公司为基础进行实证研究 ,发现中国资本市场上的控制性家族导致的代理问题刚刚开始出现。家族类上市公司中既存在所有权层面的控制权与现金流权分离所形成第一重代理关系 ,也存在家族企业主与家族 非家族雇员在管理层面形成的第二重代理关系 ,研究发现前者对家族类上市公司价值具有负面影响 ,而后者则具有双面的影响

关 键 词:家族控制  企业价值  代理  托宾Q

Family Control and Firm Value: Evidence from China Listed Companies
Su Qilin & Zhu Wen.Family Control and Firm Value: Evidence from China Listed Companies[J].Economic Research Journal,2003(8).
Authors:Su Qilin & Zhu Wen
Institution:Jinan University;Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University
Abstract:This thesis undertakes its reach on the basis of the 128 family controlled listed companies trading publicly in the Shanghai and Shenzhen security markets in 2002 and comes to the finding that the agency problem brought about by the family controlling characteristic in the capital market of China is emerging. There exists in the family controlled listed companies the first layer of agency relationship between the control rights of the ownership level and the departure of cash flow rights on the one hand, and on the other hand there also exists the second layer of agency relationship in the management level between family controlled listed company owners and family/non family employees. The research reveals that the first one has a negative effect on the firm value of the family controlled companies, while the second one has a two sided effect.
Keywords:family control  firm value  agency  Tobin'Q
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