市场化进程、国企改革策略与公司治理结构的内生决定

本文以2001年至2003年间中国地方政府控制的上市公司为对象,考察了各地区市场化进程差异以及中央政府基于公司规模和行业特征采取的"抓大放小"和"战略调整"的国企改革策略对公司最终控制人政府级别、政府持股比例以及政府持股方式的影响。研究发现:在市场化进程越快的地区,上市公司更可能由低级别地方政府控制、政府持有股权比例更低;并且,大规模公司、管制性行业公司更可能由高级别地方政府控制、政府持有股权比例更高。但在政府持股方式上,市场化进程的影响并不稳定,而大规模公司由政府直接持股的可能性更小,并且管制性行业与非管制性行业公司无显著区别。这些结果表明,地区市场化进程以及中央政府采取的国企改革策略对公司治理结构的形成具有重要影响(主要体现在政府级别和持股比例上)——地区市场化进程减轻了地方政府控制公司的经济动机,而国企改革策略使得地方政府具有控制大规模公司和管制性行业公司的政治动机。上述结论在剔除深圳和上海地区公司以减轻样本特殊性问题、采用工具变量法以减轻内生性问题以及一系列稳健性检验后仍成立。

Marketization,SOE Reform Strategy,and Endogenously Determined Corporate Governance Structure

Using the data of listed firms in 2001 to 2003, this paper investigates the endogenous determination of corporate governance structure of listed firms ultimately controlled by Chinese local governments. Specifically, we explore how the degree of regional marketization and the central government's "seize big, drop small" and "strategic restructuring" of SOE reform strategies, based respectively on firm size and industry category, influence the ultimate controlling government's level, government's share ratio and government's shareholding method. We find that, in the regions with higher degree of marketization, listed firms are more likely to be ultimately controlled by low level local governments, and the local governments are more likely to control small ratio of shares. However, large firms and the firms in regulatory industries are more likely to be ultimately controlled by high level local governments, and the local governments are more likely to control a block ratio of their shares. The effects of marketization and industry category on government's shareholding method are not robust, and large firms are more likely than small firms to be indirectly controlled by local governments. The results together indicate that regional marketization and the central government's SOE reform strategy shape the corporate governance structure of listed firms ultimately controlled by Chinese local governments.