融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置

本文构造了一个两层次委托代理模型,强调了外部资本市场和内部资本市场之间的相互作用,分析表明,资本配置扭曲和资本使用效率低下的关键是外部资本市场运作不完善对企业内部管理者的寻租行为的影响。本文的分析表明,融资成本偏低的外部资本市场不仅会促使企业CEO过分扩大融资规模,而且会加剧企业内部管理者的寻租行为,导致资本配置不当、投资缺乏效率的不良后果。本文的政策含义是,必须改变融资成本偏低的现状,并加强公司治理结构建设,才能解决我国企业融资过热、资本使用效率低下等一系列问题。

Financing Cost, Rent Seeking and Capital Allocation inside Firms

The paper develops a two-tiered principal-agency model where the imp erfection of external capital market can influence the rent-seeking activities of division managers. This factor turns out to be the key to understanding the dist ortion of capital allocation inside firms. Moreover, we emphasize interaction b etween internal capital markets and external capital markets. In our model, when the financing cost in external capital market is low enough, the CEOs will have strong incentive to expand the scale of external financing. The distortion in e xternal capital market will exacerbate the rent-seeking activities of division m anagers and lead to the low efficiency in capital allocation inside firms. The p olicy implications from the model are obvious. In order to solve the problem of excess capital-raising and to improve the efficiency of investment, we must mak e the financing cost a good reflection of cost-of-capital in external capital m arket and reinforce the corporate governance inside firms.